The tensions between Russia and Ukraine at the start of the year have generated renewed analytical interest in Russia’s re-emerging position as a superpower, driven chiefly by its actual, or potential, domination of the global supplies of energy. Along with its role as a swing supplier of oil (enabling it to manipulate the balance of power between OPEC and the industrialised consumers), the episode has highlighted Russia’s position as the pre-eminent supplier of gas. Russia controls a third of global proven gas reserves, with Gazprom already becoming the dominant supplier in the EU and Turkey, in addition to Russia’s “near abroad”, including the energy-hungry Ukraine.
However, the drivers of Russia’s potential for becoming an energy superpower are not limited to its own resources. An additional factor is Russia’s near monopoly over the Central Asian export infrastructure, which remains unbroken by the single Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (in operation since May 2005). Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the continued instability in the Middle East (which some argue has been deepened, rather than reduced, by the US invasion of Iraq) has boosted Russia’s position as the aspiring centre of energy geopolitics.
Add to this several other key factors such as the long-term outlook for high energy prices, the limited ability of the US and EU to diversify their supply sources and Russia’s growing ability to play a China and/or Iran “card” both in energy and geopolitics and the picture that emerges is one of a global energy superpower, capable in many ways to counter the might of present-day sole superpower the United States.
Furthermore, there have been significant signs that this re-emerging superpower also means business in the military sphere. Russia has recently commissioned a new generation of missiles (Topol-M), capable of fitting a nuclear warhead and able to evade current US anti-missile defence systems. While not signalling a return to a Cold War style arms race, this development suggests Russia is no longer willing to refrain from a bit of old fashioned sabre rattling, when it feels the need to do so.
At the same time, Moscow has notified those who need to know of its determination to protect its vital strategic interests. While not seeking to become the exclusive great power player in the former Soviet Union, Russia has let it be known that it does not regard Western interests in the region as being on par with its own. It will therefore resist Western incursion in the area deemed incompatible with the pursuit of legitimate economic and political objectives.
In practice this boils down to the promotion of anti-Russian regimes in the region, through so called “colour revolutions”. Thus, in an unusual move, Russia’s defence minister, Sergei Ivanov has written in The Wall Street Journal that the Kremlin’s key objective is the prevention of Western-fomented regime changes in Russia’s “near abroad” the CIS.
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Russia as the "Other Europe"
Let us consider the question: What does Russia really want? Is Russia a neo-imperial power that wants to dominate its weaker neighbors, or is it a post-imperial state that is simply trying to defend its legitimate interests? Does Moscow view the European Union as a strategic partner or does it view it as a threat to Russia’s ambitions in Europe? How stable is Putin’s regime, how sustainable is Russia’s economic growth, and what are the Kremlin’s long-term interests and short-term fears?
Historian Martin Malia has said that “the West is not necessarily most alarmed when Russia is in reality most alarming, nor most reassured when Russia is in fact most reassuring.” The West is most alarmed when it is confused about Russia’s interests and strategies.
Putin’s Russia is frightening precisely because it is confusing. Russia is, at the same time, a rising global power and a weak state with corrupt and inefficient institutions. The contradictions go further: Putin’s regime can be described as rock solid and also extremely vulnerable. Russia’s economic growth looks both impressive and unsustainable. Russia’s foreign policy is a puzzle. Even as Russia becomes increasingly capitalist and Westernized, its policies become increasingly anti-Western.
THE RISE OF THE DECLINING POWER
A new reality in Europe is the re-emergence of Russia as a threat to its neighborhood, a major player that is seen to be unfriendly and unreliable. At the same time, however, it is an indispensable interlocutor of the West.
Russia’s resurgence is occurring at a time when the global hegemony of the U.S. is in decline and the European Union is suffering a profound crisis of self-confidence. It comes at a time of “fundamental heterogeneity and contradiction pertaining both to the nature of political units and the character of the tensions, solidarities and oppositions between these units.” So, the question is: How serious is the Russian challenge and how did the current crisis in relations between Russia and the West arise? Is Russia a rising power, or is it a declining power that is merely enjoying a temporary revival?
Soaring gas and oil prices have made energy-rich Russia more powerful, less cooperative and more arrogant. The petrodollars that have floated the state budget have dramatically decreased the Russian state’s dependence on foreign funding. Today, Russia has the third largest hard currency reserves in the world. Moreover, it is running a huge current account surplus and paying off the last of its debts accumulated in the early 1990s. Russia’s reliance on Western loans has turned into Europe’s reliance on Russian oil and gas.
Russia’s military budget has increased six times since the beginning of the 21st century, and Russia’s intelligence network has penetrated all corners of Europe. For now at least, Chechnya has been pacified and Russia has succeeded in regaining the strategic initiative in Central Asia. Russia’s influence in global politics has also increased dramatically. The Security Council deadlock over the status of Kosovo is the latest demonstration of the new reality: Russia can no longer be ignored. In short, Russia is a rising power that will no longer accept lectures from others. Today, Russia wants to lecture.
Rise and re-emergence of Putin’s Russia
In a televised address on July 17, President Vladimir Putin proclaimed: “There are forces both in Russia and the US that abide by 20th Century thinking, rather than the 21st Century, those who love and feed on ideas of the past competition. While protecting our national interests we can always find solutions to problems through compromise, rather than confrontation”.
Precisely a month later, Putin announced: “At midnight today, August 17, 14 strategic missile carriers, support and refuelling aircraft took off from seven air-force bases in different parts of the Russian Federation and began a patrol involving a total of 20 aircraft. Such patrols will be carried out on a regular basis. The patrols are strategic in nature”.
As Russian aircraft spread out across the Atlantic, resuming a practice ended in 1992, NATO jet-fighters in Europe scrambled from their bases to deal with a totally new situation. Significantly, this development followed Moscow’s decision to develop strategic nuclear capabilities to counter the US decision to deploy anti-ballistic missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic, despite Russian concerns.
Ever since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Russians have witnessed American and NATO measures to contain their influence and encircle them militarily and diplomatically. These measures included the admission of former Warsaw Pact members and such Soviet Republics as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into NATO, coupled with various forms of associate arrangements between NATO and the former Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
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The Re-emergence of an Assertive Russia August 29, 2007
Russia's decision to resume the Soviet-era practice of sending strategic bombers on long-range flights well beyond its borders, just a few days after concluding an air exercise over the North Pole involving such aircraft, seems to suggest a willingness to challenge US intrusion into its neighbourhood and NATO's continuing eastward expansion. Some 14 strategic bombers took off from seven airfields across Russia, along with support and refuelling aircraft on August 17. These long-range bombers carried out patrol flights in various parts of the world, including over the Arctic, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as well as over the Black Sea. The flights concentrated on major shipping routes and areas of Russia's economic interest. This Russian move has been considered as a bounce back policy, in protest against US plans to deploy part of its missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland supposedly for guarding new NATO states against missile attacks mainly originating from Iran. The Russian decision to despatch these bomber sorties has been interpreted as Putin's effort to boost Russian military power and show to the world Russia's renewed capabilities. Following as it does other Russian decisions in recent months like missile tests, announcements about not complying with the INF treaty and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, etc., the resumption of long-range bomber flights has led some analysts to draw similarities with the Cold War era confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Russia considers the deployment of portions of the US missile shield in its immediate neighbourhood as a threat to its own security, mainly because any interception of missiles targeted at eastern or central Europe would definitely take place over Russian airspace, which might prove harmful to its population. Russia has pointed out that interceptors could be fired from US ships, which would result in debris harmlessly falling into the sea. Moreover, the Russian discourse on the issue highlights the point that the US claim of protecting its European allies from Iranian missiles is misleading, given that Iran is at present not in a position to manufacture missiles that can reach Europe. It is felt that the actual American intention in deploying these systems is to keep Russia pegged in. Russian analysts have also expressed the apprehension that the deployment of these systems could also potentially cause a rift between Russia on the one hand and countries of Eastern and Central Europe on the other.
As an alternative, President Putin has proposed the use of the Gabala radar facility in Azerbaijan, which is geographically closer to Iran. Moreover, the radar at Azerbaijan could easily cover the whole of Europe, whereas a similar installation in Eastern/Central Europe might not be able to do this. Negotiations on this proposal are being carried out by a working group of military and diplomatic experts drawn from Russia and the United States.
Russia To Resume Long-Range Bomber Patrols
President Vladimir Putin said Friday that he had ordered the military to resume regular long-range flights of strategic bombers, a show of Russia's resurgent military power amid a chill in relations with the U.S.Speaking after Russian and Chinese forces completed major war games exercises for the first time on Russian turf, Putin said a halt in long-range bombers' flights after the Soviet collapse had affected Russia's security. Other nations, he said, had continued such missions — an oblique reference to the United States.
"I have made a decision to resume regular flights of Russian strategic aviation," Putin said in televised remarks. "We proceed from the assumption that our partners will view the resumption of flights of Russia's strategic aviation with understanding."
In Washington, a State Department Spokesman said the U.S. was not troubled by the Russian decision.
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The Reemergence of the Iron Curtain
While the Bush administration has lost its ability to assert itself internationally, the void in cohesive diplomatic power combined with fluctuating energy markets has created the opportunity for problematic relationships to develop outside of the Western spheres. China, a country high on energy demand and human rights abuse, and Russia, supplier of ever more tainted and corrupt oil, have become important trading partners. With the United States and Great Britain’s involvement in Iraq, NATO’s deployment in Afghanistan, and the short-term reliance on Russian gas in continental Europe, China and Russia have built a viable economic partnership as both continually support undemocratic and rogue states. While this has not manifested into a full-fledged political partnership, both China and Russia are increasingly agreeing on international issues that demand multilateral efforts.In the first three months of 2006, bilateral trade between Russia and China exceeded $12 billion or up 53% year-on-year, and “it is only a beginning,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said during the SCO meeting June 15-16. “We have discussed military-technical cooperation—the volumes are very large, worth billions of dollars—and we intend to sustain these volumes”. On the sidelines of the high-profile bilateral summit meetings at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) sessions, Russian and Chinese officials reiterated earlier pledges to develop trade and investment cooperation (Sergei Blagov, Jamestown Foundation). The foundation of the agreements have been China’s energy demand and the Russian ability to supply crude oil, with neither having issues with one another’s pocked human rights record. The economic agreements are strengthened by similar aspirations towards Iran and North Korea, with the West desperately seeking each diplomatic support.
Obviously, climate has a big influence on plants and animals in the natural environment, on oceans, and on human activities, such as agriculture, water supplies, and heating and cooling. The effects of climate change depend upon how much change there is, how fast it occurs, and how easily the world can adapt to the new conditions.